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The United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to 
leave the European Union (EU) has 
unexpectedly created a situation of 
uncertainty and insecurity for almost 
3.5 million EU27 nationals currently 
residing in the UK. This is especially the 
case for Central and Eastern Europeans 
who took advantage of the EU’s freedom of 
movement to immigrate to the UK in large 
numbers after their countries joined the 
community in 2004 and 2007. The numbers 
are significant: over 900,000 Poles, 
310,000 Romanians, 185,000 Lithuanians, 
and 93,000 Slovaks are threatened with the 
loss of rights to freely live and work in the 
UK.1 Despite political pressure, the British 
                                               
1
 Annual Population Survey (APS), Office of 
National Statistics. According to some 
estimations, the numbers may be significantly 
higher, over 1 mln of Poles, 250,000 
Lithuanians etc. 
government had repeatedly refused to 
guarantee migrants’ rights and made it a 
subject of political negotiations with 
Brussels. Uncertainty continued, with 
citizens’ rights being used as leverage in 
the negotiations between the UK and the 
European Commission. On December 8, 
December 2017, an agreement was finally 
reached between the negotiators of the 
European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government, just before the December 
2017 European Council Summit.2 
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 Joint report from the negotiators of the 
European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government on progress during phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United 
Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
European Union, 8.12. 2017, TF50 (2017) 19 – 
Commission to EU 27, art 8. 
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The issue of EU citizens’ rights is a 
politically sensitive one for many countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
(especially Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Slovakia) due to the large number of their 
nationals living in the UK. For countries 
with small populations (e.g. Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Slovakia) the share of their 
nationals residing in the UK as a 
percentage of their total population is up to 
6.29% (Lithuania) and 4.60% (Latvia), 
making the issue of maintaining the rights’ 
of EU27 migrants living in the UK 
absolutely crucial. Moreover, most of the 
migrants are still voters in their countries of 
origin; as a result, protecting their rights 
has become one of the main concerns on 
the political agenda for the region. The 
Brussels’ negotiators have recognised the 
importance of this issue.  
 
Although some governments (e.g. Poland) 
have announced their willingness to attract 
migrants to return by preparing special 
programmes supporting homecoming, 
those programmes are neither sufficient 
nor attractive enough to drive return 
migration. It seems that neither the state 
(as well as its labour market) is ready for 
mass returns, nor is the majority willing to 
return. Nonetheless, governments and 
politicians keen to show that they look after 
their citizens have been putting pressure 
on the EC negotiators. Any concessions 
would negatively be received by the public. 
  
This policy paper provides a general 
overview of the Central and Eastern 
European regional perspective on the 
ongoing Brexit negotiations. It focuses on 
the free movement of people and the rights 
of EU27 citizens living in the UK. It argues 
that those EU27 nationals acquired (or will 
acquire) their rights on the basis of the 
EU’s freedom of movement (without time 
limit), and, therefore, their rights should be 
maintained despite the UK’s withdrawal 
from the Union. To enrich the ongoing 
debates with facts and opinions from the 
region, this paper seeks to sum up the 
arguments and the state of play in order to 
better highlight the outlook of CEE on the 
matter. 
 
CEE nationals in the UK –  
who is affected by Brexit? 
 
The UK, Ireland and Sweden were the only 
“old” EU member states that decided to 
open their labour markets to workers from 
the eight Central and Eastern European 
states that joined the EU in 2004. The 
British government had estimated the 
possible number of immigration from the 
region to be between 5,000 and 13,000 
annually, however the numbers were far 
beyond that. A massive migration flow from 
CEE, especially Poland, resulted in one of 
the biggest migration waves in the history 
of the country. It started with 53,000 
immigrants from the region coming in 2004, 
increasing to 76,000 in 2005, 92,000 
in 2006 and reaching peaks of 117,000 
in 2007, 129,000 in 2014 and 138,000 
in 2015 (due in part to rapid increase 
of immigration from Bulgaria and 
Romania.3) Since 2004, net migration from 
the region (difference between those 
coming and leaving) has always been 
above zero, reaching 91,000 in 2007 and 
104,000 in 2015. 
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 Those numbers only include migrants 
according to the United Nations definition, i.e. 
moving to the UK for at least 12 months, and 
excluding large numbers of seasonal workers. 
See. Net Migration Statistics, Migration Watch 
UK, 
https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-
migration-statistics/#create-graph. 
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Graph 1. Net migration from CEE to the 
UK 2004-2016 (in thousands) 
 
* Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
**Bulgaria, Romania 
*** Sum of lines 2 and 3 
Source: Net Migration Statistics, Migration 
Watch UK, 
https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-
migration-statistics/#create-graph. 
 
The 2004 migration wave from Poland, the 
country with the highest number of 
migrants in the UK, had the effect of 
opening the UK labour market for most of 
the CEE region. In 2002, Polish data 
showed 24,000 Polish migrants living in the 
UK compared to 294,000 in Germany, i.e. 
the main destination for Polish emigrants at 
the time. In 2004, the number of Poles in 
the UK increased to 150,000, doubled in 
2005 (340,000) and reached 580,000 in 
2006, for the first time overtaking the 
number of Polish migrants in Germany 
(450,000).4 
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 M. Okólski, J. Salt, Polish Emigration to the 
UK after 2004, Why Did So Many Come?, 
Central and Eastern European Migration 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, December 2014, pp. 11–
37. 
As of now, migration from CEE reached 1.8 
million. Half of this number is constituted of 
immigrants from 
Poland, making 
them the largest 
foreign-born 
minority in the UK 
(even before 
Pakistani and 
Indian nationals). 
Poland, India and 
Pakistan account 
for 9.5%, 9.0% 
and 5.9% 
respectively of the 
UK’s foreign-born 
population 
(followed by Ireland with 4.5% and 
Germany with 3.3%). Polish and Indian 
nationalities are also the main foreign 
nationalities in the UK, with Poles being the 
largest group (15.7%) of foreign citizens.5 
 
Table 2. Overseas-born population in 
the United Kingdom (60 most common 
countries of birth, 2016) 
Country 
Rounded up 
estimates 
Poland 911,000 
Republic of Ireland 389,000 
Romania 310,000 
Germany 300,000 
Italy 201,000 
Lithuania 185,000 
France 158,000 
Spain 153,000 
Portugal 131,000 
Slovakia 93,000 
Latvia 92,000 
Hungary 91,000 
                                               
5
 Migration in the UK Statistics, The Migration 
Observatory, 21.02.2017, 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resou
rces/briefings/migrants-in-the-uk-an-overview/. 
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Bulgaria 85,000 
Netherlands 69,000 
Greece 63,000 
Cyprus 62,000 
Czech Republic 54,000 
Belgium 36,000 
Sweden 35,000 
Malta 30,000 
Total 8,137,000 
Total non-EU 4,689,000 
Total EU6 3,448,000 
Total EU8 
(Central and 
Eastern Europe) 
1,821,000 
Source: Annual Population Survey (APS), 
Office of National Statistics
7
 
 
These figures indicate that the issue of EU 
citizens’ rights in the UK has a different 
meaning among CEE countries. Although 
they all support the European Commission 
in the Brexit negotiations, the significance 
of the issue in public debates differs 
between, for instance, the Czech Republic 
and Lithuania due to their different share of 
nationals residing in the UK as a 
percentage of their total population. To 
compare, in Lithuania the issue of EU 
citizens’ rights is a significant political factor 
leading not only to a debate about a 
change in the constitution (to allow dual 
citizenship), but also to a debate in the 
parliament (Seimas) in April 2017 with the 
participation of the representatives of the 
Lithuanian community in the UK presenting 
their concerns and the results of a survey 
of Lithuanians in the UK.8 On the other 
                                               
6
 Only 20 top EU countries are represented 
here. 
7
 Published on 24 August 2017 by the Office for 
National Statistics. 
8
 Ramūnas Vilpišauskas, Lithuania and Brexit: 
security, money and citizens, In: Negotiating 
Brexit: What do the UK’s negotiating partners 
want?, 2017, University of East Anglia. 
 
hand, migrants from Estonia are so few 
that they are not even mentioned in UK 
statistics (immigration to the UK is low 
because the country is small, but also 
because emigration from Estonia is low as 
Estonian workers would rather go to 
Finland for the workweek and head back 
home for the weekend). 
 
High emigration has a multidimensional 
impact on the home country and represents 
a significant economic factor for countries 
such as Poland or Lithuania, both positive 
(lowering unemployment, financial 
remittances, etc.) and negative (brain drain 
etc.). In case of Lithuania, one can 
consider the post-2004 wave of emigration 
as a demographic crisis with significant 
political consequences, but also as a 
positive factor that helped absorb the 
European economic crisis in the country. 
As such, Brexit raises the important 
question of the extent to which the 
emigration trend might be reversed, and 
what would be the possible resulting 
economic effects. 
 
Table 3. The share of migrants residing 
in the UK as a percentage of their home 
country population (2017)   
CEE 
countries 
Estimated 
number of 
emigrants 
in the UK  
Population  
(in mln) 
Share of 
migrants   
Poland 911,000 38.0 2.40% 
Romania 310,000 19.9 1.55% 
Lithuania 185,000 2.9 6.29% 
Slovakia 93,000 5.4 1.72% 
Latvia 92,000 2.0 4.60% 
Hungary 91,000 9.9 0.92% 
Bulgaria 85,000 7.2 1.17% 
Czech 
Republic 
54,000 10.5 0.51% 
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Source: Own calculation on the basis of the 
Office of National Statistics and Eurostat 
 
Citizens’ rights in Brexit negotiations – 
continuing uncertainty  
 
The European Union position 
The negotiating position of the European 
Union was presented by the European 
Commission on June 2017 and was in line 
with the expectations of the CEE region. 
Brussels demanded that the rights of EU 
citizens living in the UK, UK citizens living 
in the EU as well as their family members 
be fully guaranteed on the basis of EU law, 
i.e. the free movement of people. The only 
limitation was to be the cut-off date of 
arrival – before or after the entry into force 
of the Withdrawal Agreement, i.e. the date 
of Brexit as such. 
 
According to the EU position, EU nationals 
would not be obliged to confirm their 
residency in the UK with documents, and 
the five-year residency would automatically 
guarantee them the right to permanent 
residency. Those guarantees would cover 
not only EU and UK citizens, but also their 
family members, even if they are non-EU 
nationals (or third-country nationals). 
Guarantees would also cover persons 
being in the process of obtaining their 
rights (e.g. to pension) and even those 
working in the UK while living in another 
EU member state (and vice versa). As 
mentioned, the EU position ensures that all 
citizens’ rights are maintained in the same 
manner as they currently are – including 
right to free access to education, full 
access to the labour market and, most 
importantly, the right to family reunification. 
On the other hand, the EU position did not 
cover voting rights in local or European 
Parliament elections. 
 
Those regulations resulting from EU laws 
would be guaranteed by the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and the European Commission would be 
entitled to monitor the situation, both in the 
member states and in the United Kingdom. 
 
The UK position 
Despite political pressure, the United 
Kingdom repeatedly denied to unilaterally 
guarantee the rights of EU citizens living in 
the UK.9 Instead it proposed an entirely 
new system created only for the EU27 
nationals and based on the British 
immigration law, but creating completely 
new legal categories for migrants from the 
EU. 
 
The UK’s proposal intends to create three 
groups of migrants, each with a different 
status. In the best situation would be those 
able to confirm having lived in the UK for a 
continued five-year period before the cut-
off date (including two years of grace 
period). Those migrants will receive a so-
called “settled status”, similar to the one 
obtained by non-EU nationals living in the 
UK for five years but without the necessity 
of having to prove continuity of medical 
insurance. The last exclusion is not 
insignificant. This status will guarantee a 
right to reside and, as such, a right to apply 
for British citizenship (after six years 
                                               
9
 Such guarantees were demanded by the 
Labour Party and Liberal Democrats and many 
NGOs, and the House of Lords proposed an 
appropriate amendment in the Withdrawal Bill, 
which was rejected by the ruling Conservative 
Party. See. MPs reject Lords amendment to 
guarantee rights of EU nationals before Brexit 
negotiations begin, Independent, 13.03.2017, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics 
/mps-reject-lords-amendment-to-guarantee-
rights-of-eu-nationals-before-brexit-
negotiations-begin-a7628116.html. 
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altogether), and access to all social 
benefits and services.10 
 
Migrants with settled status would be in a 
relatively comfortable situation however, 
one has to take into account the lack of 
automatism, i.e. the necessity to apply for 
the status and proving inhabitancy, and the 
possibility that the status would be denied 
to people who committed a crime in the 
UK. Moreover, in case of leaving the UK for 
more than two years the status would be 
lost unless a person “has strong ties in the 
UK”11, which is discretionary and creates 
additional uncertainty. On top of that, 
applications for the settled status would be 
submitted individually (not by the family as 
a whole). Therefore, the outcome of the 
procedure might differ for each family 
member.  
 
Migrants unable to prove five-year 
inhabitancy in the UK would find 
themselves in a less comfortable situation. 
They would be entitled to apply for a 
temporary status to fulfil the five-year 
period and afterwards to apply for a settled 
status, however without any guarantee of 
receiving it. Moreover, granting this status 
will depend on the British law in force at the 
time.  
 
The UK wanted to guarantee existing rights 
of citizens (both, from the UK and the EU) 
to vote and stand in local elections. 
 
Agreement 
On December 8, 2017, prior to the 
December European Council summit, the 
                                               
10
 The United Kingdom’s Exit from the 
European Union Safeguarding the Position of 
EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals 
Living in the EU. Presented to Parliament by 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
by Command of Her Majesty, June 2017. 
11
 Ibid. 
European Commission and the UK 
Government finally reached an agreement 
on the three negotiating issues, including 
citizens’ rights. Although this is an initial 
document and not the detailed Withdrawal 
Agreement, it sets commonly agreed 
commitments and principles and clarifies 
some of the issue raised above. 
 
Concerning citizens’ rights, both parties 
have reached a common understanding 
when it comes to family reunification. All 
family members of EU citizens residing in 
the UK (and vice versa) will be entitled to 
reunite even after Brexit “for the life time of 
the right holder”, provided that they 
become related to the EU citizens before 
the Brexit date. However, despite having 
been previously demanded by the 
Commission, the agreement does not 
provide any guarantees for so-called future 
family members12 except for children, who 
will be entitled to join their parent (i.e. EU 
citizen in the UK or vice versa) regardless 
of where and when they are born (or 
adopted).13 
 
The agreement does not guarantee any 
votings rights in local nor European 
Parliamentary (in case of UK nationals in 
the EU) elections.  
 
Despite demands by the European 
Parliament, obtaining a settled status in the 
UK will not be automatic, but the 
administrative procedures for applying are 
to be “transparent, smooth and 
streamlined”. It remains to be seen how 
that will translate into practice. Importantly, 
applications made by families will be 
                                               
12
 Ibid., Joint report from the negotiators of the 
European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government on progress during phase 1 of 
negotiations…, art. 14. 
13
 Ibid., art. 12. 
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considered jointly.14 Furthermore, 
individuals who are already holding a 
permanent status will have to apply again 
and be a subject to verification of identity, 
criminality check and confirmation of 
ongoing residency (the procedure will be 
free of charge and the direct wording 
describes it as “document convertion into 
the new document”). As stipulated by the 
Agreement, the right of residency can only 
be lost after leaving the UK for five 
continuous years or more.15 
 
The Commission and the UK government 
have agreed that the Withdrawal 
Agreement should enable citizens to 
directly rely on their rights from the 
Agreement and any inconsistent rules 
should cease to apply. The UK government 
will legislate a bill that makes express 
reference to the Agreement and “fully 
incorporate[s] the citizens’ rights Part into 
UK law”.16 
 
However, monitoring of maintaining of 
citizens’ rights in the UK will not be 
provided by the EC, as previously 
demanded, but by an independent UK 
authority whose role will be discussed in a 
later stage of the negotiations. The role of 
the EU Court of Justice will be similarly 
limited. UK courts can ask the ECJ for 
interpretation, and this mechanism will exist 
for eight years after Brexit.17 
 
It is difficult to estimate how many would be 
affected by the five-year residency criteria 
because it still depends on how the 
transition period will be calculated. 
However, migrants from Bulgaria and 
Romania will be among those particularly 
                                               
14
 Ibid., art. 17. 
15
 Ibid., art. 23-25. 
16
 Ibid., art. 34-35. 
17
 Ibid., art. 38-40. 
affected due to the rapid increase of 
emigration to the UK from these countries 
since 2012.18 
 
In a worse situation would be those arriving 
in the UK after the cut-off date. They would 
be allowed to stay in the UK “at least for a 
temporary stay”19 and might be entitled to 
settle, but they cannot expect any 
guarantee of receiving a settled status. 
Little is known about the details of the 
future situation of “latecomers” but it seems 
that for those migrants, citizens rights’ 
including political rights (voting and right to 
candidacy in local elections), the right to 
free access to education, full access to the 
labour market and, most importantly, the 
right to family reunification will not be 
continued.  
 
The cut-off date 
Throughout the negotiations, the UK had 
been insistent that the cut-off date would 
not necessarily be the date of the UK 
withdrawal from the European Union. The 
British position was that the cut-off date 
had yet to be set and could be any date 
between March 29, 2017, i.e. the date 
when Article 50 was triggered, and March 
29, 2019, i.e. the probable date of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU.20 
 
The issue had become one of the main 
points of contention in the negotiations and 
a major concern for EU27 citizens living in 
the UK. Indeed, those who find themselves 
                                               
18
 Net Migration Statistics, Migration Watch UK, 
https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/statistics-net-
migration-statistics/#create-graph. 
19
 Ibid. Net Migration Statistics, Migration Watch 
UK. 
20
 The United Kingdom’s Exit from the 
European Union. Safeguarding the Position of 
EU Citizens Living in the UK and UK Nationals 
Living in the EU, Presented to Parliament by 
the Secretary of State for the Home Department 
by Command of Her Majesty, June 2017. 
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on the wrong side of the cut-off date remain 
in an uncertain situation: “Those EU 
citizens and their family members who 
arrive in between the specified date and 
the date the UK leaves the EU will continue 
to exercise free movement rights up until 
the point the UK leaves the EU. From then 
on, the grace period of blanket permission 
will apply to them, while they make an 
application to the Home Office for 
permission to stay (‘leave to remain’), in 
accordance with the new rules applying 
to EU cit izens, which are yet to be 
determined” [emphasis added].21 
Therefore, notwithstanding the unclear 
“grace period”, the decision regarding the 
cut-off date would have a major impact on 
migrants’ eligibility to access benefits, 
pensions, healthcare, higher education 
etc.22 
 
In response, the European Parliament 
assessed the UK settled status proposal as 
“nothing less than relegation to second-
class status”. It also underlined that “Above 
all, the UK proposal means that EU citizens 
would have no guarantee that the UK 
Parliament would not make changes to UK 
immigration law in the future, meaning no 
life-long protection”.23 
 
From a personal point of view, this situation 
would create two essential problems. 
Firstly, according to the New Europeans 
and Britain in Europe report, the cut-off 
                                               
21
 Ibid. p. 12. 
22
 D.  Giannoulopoulos, R.  Ziegler, The rights 
of EU27 citizens in the UK and UK citizens in 
the EU27. A response to Theresa May’s ‘fair 
and serious’ offer, 10 July 2017, New 
Europeans, Britain in Europe, p. 6. 
23
 Assessment of the Brexit Steering Group on 
the UK Paper “Safeguarding the Position of EU 
citizens living in the UK and UK Nationals living 
in the EU, Position paper of the European 
Parliament Brexit steering group on Brexit, Sent 
to Michel Barnier on 06-07-2017. 
date dispute already restricts EU27 citizens 
travelling outside the UK as it may interrupt 
their continuous residence in the UK and 
affect their legal situation after Brexit. 
 
The EU position was clear; the “cut-off” 
date is the date of withdrawal. This was 
confirmed by the European Parliament 
which warned that it intends to reject any 
other solution.24 So, why is the UK position 
different? One explanation is that it is afraid 
of a pre-Brexit increase in immigration from 
those, who, in Secretary of State for Exiting 
the European Union David Davis’ words, 
want to beat the deadline.25 Waiting until 
the very last moment, i.e the end of phase 
1, to agree to the date prevented migrants 
from coming in the meantime. The second 
is that the UK’s government wanted to 
make the date a topic of negotiations to 
eventually agree with the EU’s position 
(which is what happened), but in exchange 
get concessions elsewhere. 
 
As of the December 8, both parties in the 
negotiations have agreed for the specified 
date to be the time of the UK’s 
withdrawal.26 The EU position prevailed. 
 
The issue of dual-citizenship 
Despite more clarity, it is important to note 
that the joint commitments set out above 
are under the caveat that nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed. It therefore does 
                                               
24
 Ibid. 
25
 UK may impose cut-off date on EU migrants, 
says Brexit minister, The Guardian, 17.07.2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2016/jul/17/brexit-minister-cut-off-date-eu-
migrants-david-davis. 
26
 Joint report from the negotiators of the 
European Union and the United Kingdom 
Government on progress during phase 1 of 
negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United 
Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
European Union, 8.12. 2017, TF50 (2017) 19 – 
Commission to EU 27, art 8. 
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not come as a surprise that many migrants 
want to secure their position in more 
reliable terms. The best option to do so is 
to obtain British citizenship. Nearly 30,000 
EU nationals applied to become British 
citizens in the 12 months following the 
referendum - almost twice as many as in 
the previous year.27 This increase in the 
number of acquisition of British citizenship 
is especially significant in the cases of 
Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and Slovaks. 
In the first half of 2017, there were 4,171 
Poles who applied for British citizenship, up 
from 1,526 in the same period in 2016, 
meaning an increase by 270% (!).28 This 
tendency is common for all citizens from 
the region. In the case of Lithuanians, the 
number of citizenship applications in the 
first quarter of 2017 rose to 192 (compared 
to 119 in the first quarter of 2016), in the 
case of Latvians, the number of citizenship 
applications in the first quarter of 2017 rose 
to 261 (compared to 89 in the first quarter 
of 2016) and in the case of Slovaks the 
number of citizenship applications in the 
first quarter of 2017 rose to 139 (compared 
to 57 in the first quarter of 2016).29 
 
However, this raises the important issue of 
dual citizenship. For example, Poles are in 
a relatively comfortable situation because 
even though Poland does not recognize 
dual citizenship, it does not forbid it either 
(Polish citizens are regarded as Poles by 
                                               
27
 EU applications for UK citizenship up 80% 
since Brexit, BBC News, 25.08.2017, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41053684, Dual 
nationality not an option for Dutch living in post-
Brexit UK: Dutch PM, NL Times, 18.07.2017, 
https://nltimes.nl/2017/07/18/dual-nationality-
option-dutch-living-post-brexit-uk-dutch-pm. 
28
 Wave of re-migration, “The Economist”, 
26.08.2017, s. 27. 
29
 Home Office, National Statistics, Immigration 
statistics, January to March 2017 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immig
ration-statistics-january-to-march-2017. 
the Polish government regardless of other 
citizenships they may have). Therefore, a 
Polish citizen can retain his or her Polish 
citizenship and still become a British 
citizen. But that is not the case in all EU 
member states. Austria and Estonia both 
categorically deny dual citizenship to their 
citizens. Other member states allow it but 
on very strict terms, such as Lithuania and 
Slovakia, where it is only allowed at birth or 
through marriage, and in the Netherlands 
where it is permitted if the person resides in 
the EU.30  
 
That means that, in most cases, citizens of 
those states who choose to obtain British 
citizenship in order to maintain the life they 
created in the UK would lose both their 
birth right citizenship and their EU 
citizenship rights to move, reside, work, 
study, etc. in the EU (including their birth 
country). Accordingly, some states are 
trying to push for changes in order to 
protect those citizens. The Lithuanian 
parliament proposed a bill last April to allow 
Lithuanians to keep their Lithuanian 
passports.31 However, the Constitutional 
Court has ruled that allowing 
dual citizenship rights requires amending 
the Constitution – a move that can only be 
made by way of a referendum.32 Other 
                                               
30
 Dutch citizens with multiple nationalities who 
live outside the EU for more than ten years can 
lose their Dutch nationality. 
31
 Around 200,000 Lithuanians live in Great 
Britain and ¼ intend to stay there. 
Lithuania rushes to keep citizens as Brexit 
looms, Euractiv, 12.04.2017, 
https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-
europe/news/lithuania-rushes-to-keep-citizens-
as-brexit-looms/. 
32
 The referendum may be organised together 
with presidential elections in 2019. However, 
there is a fear that due to expected low turnout 
the referendum might not be valid, postponing 
the solution for an indefinite time. There is also 
some opposition to the solution of accepting 
dual citizenship by those who argue that this 
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states have made more progress, such as 
Norway’s Høyre (Conservative) Party, the 
largest party in the governing coalition, 
which, at its annual conference, voted in 
favour of a proposal to allow dual 
citizenship for its citizens. The proposal will 
be put before the parliament during the 
spring session and is expected to pass 
despite some opposition.33  
 
Yet many member states remain strictly 
opposed to allowing dual citizenship. The 
Dutch Prime Minister announced that 
nationals who wish to take British 
citizenship will be stripped of their Dutch 
passport.34 The government even launched 
a campaign to explain the risks to Dutch 
citizens abroad. This is particularly 
worrying for the 100,000 Dutch nationals 
living in Britain. In Austria it is even worse 
as the issue triggered heated debates 
centered on the large number of people 
holding illegal Turkish and Austrian dual-
citizenship. Interior Minister Wolfgang 
Sobotka’s solution to the problem is to 
introduce fines and sanctions to make it 
harder to hold dual citizenship – a step into 
the wrong direction for Austrians in the UK. 
This situation creates crucial inequality of 
EU citizens living in the UK and divides 
them into those with more and less 
privileged legal status. 
 
Correspondingly, UK citizens throughout 
the EU face a similar problem. Around 
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900,000 UK citizens are long-term 
residents of other EU countries35 and 
according to research from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science; 
at least 60% of them wish to continue to 
live in the EU27 after Brexit.36 This is an 
issue for about 300,000 Brits living in Spain 
who will have to renounce their UK 
citizenship if they wish to apply for a 
Spanish one.37 A similar issue can be 
witnessed in Germany where about 
100,000 Brits live. Germany generally only 
accepts dual citizenship from Swiss and 
nationals of EU member states.38 
Therefore, while the UK remains in the EU, 
its nationals can apply for German 
citizenship without the need to renounce 
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their UK one. After Brexit, however, new 
applicants will have to give up their UK 
citizenship.39 Since the referendum, the 
Republic of Ireland has been the state 
receiving the most applications for dual 
nationality. The year before the 
referendum, 25,207 Britons applied for Irish 
passports, 12 months after the vote that 
number rose to 64,400. Ireland provides 
UK citizens the opportunity to retain their 
rights to freedom of movement and access 
to the EU’s labour market.  
 
Jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice  
The whole system originally proposed by 
the UK was to be created in the British 
legal system and not on the basis of an 
agreement with the EU. The European 
Court of Justice would therefore not 
guarantee it and all disputes would be 
settled in British courts. 
 
Taking back sovereignty from Brussels was 
a key pillar of the ‘leave’ campaign; in the 
words of First Secretary of State Damian 
Green, “It’s what people voted for”.40 It is 
therefore not surprising that Theresa May 
wanted to end the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Justice. Speaking at a 
Tory party conference last October, she 
was categorical in her stand, “Let’s state 
one thing loud and clear: we are not 
leaving the European Union … only to 
return to the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Justice. That’s not going to 
happen.”41 However, her position has 
slightly shifted since due to the 
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impracticality of the situation. For a start, 
anyone living or doing business in the EU, 
including any government body, is subject 
to ECJ jurisdiction. To be free of it would be 
to reject the rule of law. So unless the UK 
proposes to stop doing business with 
Europe altogether it cannot escape the 
ECJ completely. Furthermore, in order to 
avoid a cliff edge, a transition period is 
needed but one without the ECJ involved 
would be impossible - an impasse that May 
now realizes. When speaking to journalists 
following the first rounds of negotiations, 
the Prime Minister’s official spokesperson 
said, “[Brexit] transition rules could involve 
the ECJ for a limited time, but obviously 
that is all a matter for negotiation.”42.  
 
For the moment, the UK Government 
‘Great Repeal Bill’ being discussed in 
Parliament plans to convert the existing 
body of European Union law into UK law. 
That includes EU regulations, the rights as 
stated in the EU treaties and “historic” pre-
Brexit case law of the ECJ. However, UK 
Prime Minister Theresa May has been 
clear about intending to end the supremacy 
of EU laws. That is, following Brexit, UK 
laws will take precedence over EU laws 
and all previous cases ruled by the ECJ will 
be given a legal status equivalent to UK 
Supreme Court judgments – effectively 
meaning that British judges will be able to 
overrule previous ECJ rulings.  
 
This raises a number of issues, such as the 
question of the rights of EU citizens living in 
post-Brexit UK. The second major issue 
concerns the arbiter of future UK-EU 
disputes. The UK’s policy paper on the 
topic claims that giving the ECJ authority 
over UK-EU disputes would be 
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unprecedented and not "fair and neutral"43. 
Instead, the UK’s government has outlined 
several models used by other countries 
that, it says, show there is no need for the 
ECJ to be the final arbiter. All of the models 
make it clear that the ECJ will no longer 
have sole jurisdiction over disputes.  
 
The key questions during the negotiations 
have been: How much influence will the 
ECJ retain under a bilateral agreement with 
the UK? And more importantly in the 
context of this paper; will the ECJ be able 
to protect the rights of EU27 nationals 
residing in the UK once the latter leaves 
the European Union? 
 
With time the British position has changed. 
In her speech in Florence in September 
2017, Theresa May proposed introducing a 
two-year transition period, during which the 
UK would fulfil membership obligations, 
including maintaining citizen’s rights. 
During this period nothing would be 
changed when it comes to the position of 
EU migrants living in the UK. Importantly, 
she has also accepted that the latters’ 
rights would be guaranteed in the EU-UK 
withdrawal treaty rather than by the UK 
legal system.44 
 
However the situation remained vague and 
unclear. When giving an interview in the 
Polish media, the British Home Secretary 
guaranteed the rights of EU citizens in the 
UK45, but did not provide further details 
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apart from introduction of a new simplified 
online system to register migrants (for EU 
citizens only).  
 
As of now, the agreement reached on 
December 8, 2017 establishes the rights of 
both UK citizens living in the EU and EU 
citizens in the UK following from those 
established in Union law. This means that 
the ECJ remain the ultimate arbiter of the 
interpretation of Union law, however, only 
for eight years from the date of application 
of the citizens' rights part (which will most 
likely be enacted on the date of 
withdrawal.) After this, “Consistent 
interpretation of the citizens' rights part 
should further be supported and facilitated 
by an exchange of case law between the 
courts and regular judicial dialogue,”46 
which is a rather vague explanation. In fact, 
the EU Court of Justice will no longer be in 
a position to guarantee the rights of EU27 
nationals residing in the UK. Especially 
since the UK parliament retains the right to 
change the law, meaning that any 
guarantee made now could be reversed in 
the future. 
 
The lack of guarantees from the British 
government during the first stages of the 
negotiations resulted in a situation where 
the rights of citizens, which should be 
treated as non-negotiable acquired rights, 
and become a subject of political 
bargaining. For many migrants this had 
caused uncertainty about theirs and their 
families’ future.  
 
Today, after 532 days, the British 
Governement has finally guaranteed rights 
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for EU27 nationals residing in the UK. 
However, despite the outcome of the 
negotiations becoming clearer, it is still 
possible for the negotiations to collapse 
resulting in the UK leaving the Union 
without any agreement. Phase 1 was 
meant to be the easy part and it took 18 
months to negotiate. Phase 2, which is 
paved with trade deals talks and the 
divorce bill negotiations, will prove harder 
to navigate. 
  
What is the impact of negotiations on 
citizens’ rights – will they come back? 
According to British data, the net migration 
from the eight CEE states (or the EU8 in 
British nomenclature) into the UK has 
decreased drastically
47
 as a result of Brexit 
and the knock-on effect of the fall of the 
pound against CEE currencies. However, 
while emigration has decreased, it is still 
too early to predict if there are any 
significant waves of “returns”. 
 
Research conducted at the Oxford 
Migration Observatory revealed that the 
number of citizens from the region applying 
for work in the UK has drastically declined 
since the Brexit referendum.
48
 The findings 
are conclusive with official governmental 
data showing a fall in immigration and a 
rise in emigration among the EU8
49
. This 
resulted in a net migration among this 
group of just 5,000 (in the 12 months 
ending in March 2017), the lowest since 
2004, compared to 39,000 (in the 12 
months ending in March 2016). Overall, net 
migration to the UK decreased significantly 
to 246,000 from 327,000 in the same 
period. On the other hand, net migration 
from Bulgaria and Romania (or EU2) was 
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less affected, 43,000 down from 61,000. 
Net migration from Western EU member 
states (or EU15) was hardly affected at all 
– 74,000 down from 76,000.
50
 
 
So far, this has not been confirmed in the 
Polish statistics, which still show an 
increase of migration to the UK. The 
Central Statistical Office of Poland has 
estimated the number of temporary 
emigrants to the UK at the end of 2016, i.e. 
after the Brexit referendum, but before the 
negotiations started, to be 788,000, up 
from 720,000 in the previous year.
51
 Newer 
data are not yet available.  
 
Representatives of the Polish minority in 
the UK suggest that the issue of returns is 
present in migrants’ discussions. They 
argue it is not only the Brexit as such but 
also the general atmosphere in the society 
towards migrants in the UK (excluding, for 
instance, Scotland) and wave of hate 
crimes against migrants that are making 
migrants leave.
52
 The Polish Ministry of 
Development estimates that up to 200,000 
migrants might decide to return.  
 
Impact on the UK labour market 
On the other hand, the decrease of 
migration has already affected the British 
labour market. A shortage in labour force 
has started to affect multiple sectors of the 
UK economy, in particular those reliant on 
low-skilled immigrants from Central and 
Eastern Europe.
53
 This shift could prove 
catastrophic for UK employers and 
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particularly for those relying on un-skilled 
migrants. Unless the UK’s government puts 
in place a flexible and affordable 
immigration system for EU nationals, a 
significant number of employers will be 
forced to relocate or focus future growth 
outside the UK.
54
 
 
In 2016, 11% (3.4 million) of the UK labour 
market were non-UK nationals, with EU 
citizens making up 7% of the workforce 
(about 2.3 million). Of those, EU8 migrants 
are particularly prevalent in low-skilled 
sectors spanning from construction, 
farming and manufacturing to care homes, 
hotels and restaurants. Those are the 
sectors that would be particularly hard-hit 
by caps on immigration. In health care, the 
number of EU nationals registering as 
nurses in England has already dropped by 
92% since the referendum, and a record 
number have been quitting the National 
Health Service (NHS): 2,700 EU nurses left 
the service in 2016, compared to 1,600 in 
2014, i.e. a 68% increase.55 The NHS is 
already under pressure because of long-
term failure to hire enough people. It 
cannot lose any more personnel. Other 
health services, such as the adult social 
care are similarly affected, 5% of those 
working there are from the EU27, a total of 
about 75,000 people. Given that the sector 
is already vastly understaffed with around 
70,000 vacancies, it cannot afford to lose 
access to EU migrants. Even before the 
Brexit vote, a report by Independent Age 
and the International Longevity Centre, two 
NGOs, estimated that by 2020, vacancies 
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could rise to 200,000, or 14% of the 
workforce required.56 Other sectors, such 
as food manufacturing will be similarly 
hard-hit; the fruit-farming industry alone 
employs 29,000 seasonal workers, with the 
vast majority coming from Central and 
Eastern Europe. The National Farmers’ 
Union, which has been pushing for a 
special visa system for seasonal workers 
on farms, warns that if a solution is not 
found many will be forced to move their 
operations to France or elsewhere in the 
EU.57  
 
An interrelated consequence brought on by 
a shortage of workers will be the inevitable 
rise in costs for the industries and 
eventually a rise in the prices of their 
products and services. As the number of 
surplus workers decreases, wages in the 
sector will begin to rise, sectoral profits will 
be squeezed, and investment will inevitably 
fall. Pro-Brexiters have argued that that 
would not happen, as UK-born citizens will 
be there to take the jobs. However, this is 
highly unlikely. Research conducted by the 
UK Governmental Office for National 
Statistics shows that nationals from 
Romania, Bulgaria and the EU8 work more 
hours than UK nationals; half of the 
working EU8 nationals (50%) and nearly 
two-thirds of Romanian and Bulgarian 
nationals (61%) work more than 40 hours 
per week, compared to a third of UK 
nationals (32%).58 Additionally, compared 
to the national average earnings (£11.30 
per hour), EU8 and EU2 earn less 
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(£8.33).59 According to Heather Rolfe, 
Associate Research Director at the 
National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR), Britain’s longest 
established independent research 
institute, businesses do not recruit EU 
migrants because they prefer them to 
British workers but because they are 
unable to fill the vacancies with UK-born 
applicants - a reason cited by 35% of the 
low-wage industry.60 Whereas Brits feel like 
they have a choice of jobs, low-skilled 
immigrants do not. They take the less 
attractive, unwanted jobs that often involve 
more intensive manual tasks for longer 
hours and cheaper pay. It therefore seems 
unlikely that Brits will flock to fill the 
vacancies left by the immigrants. That 
leaves the option of employing EU 
nationals through a visa system, however, 
that could easily add hundreds of 
thousands of pounds to individual 
companies’ costs.61 
 
Conclusion  
It is not only the outcome of the 
negotiations that matters. Even if the 
negotiations collapse, EU migrants in the 
UK would probably successfully claim their 
rights in the British courts and it is possible 
that formally at least, their legal situation 
would not change significantly. The 
problem however, is the atmosphere 
(hostility towards migrants) as well as the 
uncertainty and chaos already created. The 
media often report about how companies 
will have to cope with Brexit and the 
negative impact it will have on the 
economy. But regardless of how difficult it 
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will be, in the end companies will manage 
to struggle with the crisis with the support 
of their legal experts. It is the ordinary 
people that will have to struggle with the 
situation on their own, and those life-
changing decisions are impacted by the 
political negotiations. 
 
The situation for migrants is vague. Despite 
progress in the negotiations, some issues 
such as the exact procedures are still to be 
elaborated. Moreover, the end of 
negotiations might not necessary mean the 
end of uncertainty. Even if a compromise is 
finally reached, the European Parliament 
might veto it. It has pointed out its “red 
lines”, such as its demands, for instance, 
that the process of obtaining settled status 
be automatic.62 Finally, the agreement will 
also be voted in the UK parliament. And 
then, even if the deal is accepted by the 
parliaments, there is the question of how it 
will be implemented and how the British 
administration will cope with the millions of 
citizenship applications from EU citizens. 
 
For now, this situation has resulted in a 
decrease in net migration to the UK, a 
trend that will most certainly continue and 
intensify but it remains difficult to foresee if 
it will translate into significant “returns” of 
migrants to their home countries. According 
to some migration experts, they may rather 
choose to move to another EU member 
state, i.e. Ireland. One can have doubts 
whether the CEE countries and their labour 
markets are ready to absorb such re-
migration and whether they have a 
competitive offer (compared to the UK’s) 
for those returning.  
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